Abstract. Edon80 is a recent stream cipher design that has advanced to the third and last phase of the eSTREAM project. It has remained unbroken and untweaked since it was designed and submitted to eS-TREAM. It is now one of the 8 nal hardware candidates. In this paper we cryptanalyze the cipher by describing a key recovery attack. The complexity of the attack is around 2 69 simple operations for a keystream of similar length.
Introduction
Edon80 is a recent stream cipher design, described in [1] , that was submitted to the eSTREAM project. It uses a novel approach in stream cipher design, concatenating 80 basic building blocks derived from 4 dierent quasigroups of order 4. A quasigroup is basically a Latin square, a very simple combinatorial object.
The design has received a lot of attention and much work has been done based on Edon80. Regarding security, Hong observed in [2] that with some small probability, the period of the keystream sequence could be quite small. This was further studied by the designers themselves in [3] and later also in the paper [4] . However, this property could not be exploited in any kind of attack. A theoretical treatment of the quasigroups used in Edon80 is given in [5] . Finally, from an implementations point of view, it was shown in [6] that Edon80 can be implemented using less than 3000 gates. Even though the eSTREAM project has allowed tweaks, the Edon80 construction has remained untweaked since it was designed and submitted to eSTREAM. However, due to the probability of short periods, the designers has introduced a limitation in the number of keystream bits that can be produced per key/IV pair. This limitation is 2 48 bits and was proposed in [7] , when entering the second phase of eSTREAM.
The small implementation and the fact that the construction has remained untweaked are the main reasons for the success of Edon80 in eSTREAM its advancement to the third and last phase phase of the eSTREAM project. It is now one of the 8 nal hardware candidates.
In this paper we cryptanalyze the cipher by describing a key recovery attack. The complexity of the attack is around 2 69 for a keystream of similar length. The design philosophy is not completely broken. A design using, say, 160 concatenated quasigroup operations would be out of scope of the new attack. On the other hand, such a change of the design would double the implementation cost, making such a design much less interesting.
The new attack to be presented is based on exploiting some periodicity inside the generator. Using the fact that some elements will repeat with large probability, we can build a kind of test to nd out the correct value of the key bits used at the end of the concatenation. This leads to a key recovery attack, where we may vary some parameters and obtain a trade-o between required length of the received key stream and the computational complexity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in more detail the stream cipher design Edon80. In Section 3 we summarize some previous work relating to the security of Edon80. In Section 4 we then give the basic ideas of the new attack, followed by a more detailed analysis in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss how the attack can be eciently implemented. In Section 7 we verify some of the claims by presenting simulation results. Finally, in Section 8 we derive some possible attack complexities and then we conclude.
Description of Edon80
In this section we give a description of the Edon80 stream cipher. An additive synchronous stream cipher is built around a keystream generator. A generator takes a key K and an IV value (nonce) IV as its input and produces an arbitrary long keystream sequence Z = z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , . . .. The keystream is then added to the plaintext in the encryption phase.
The sizes of the key and IV in Edon80 are 80 bits and 64 bits, respectively. The design of Edon80 is based on string transformation using 4 quasigroups of order 4 denoted (Q, • j ) (0 ≤ j ≤ 3). The internal updated state consists of 80 memory cells of two bits each. Each memory cell, referred to as an e-transformer * i (0 ≤ i ≤ 79), holds 2 bits representing a value between 0 and 3. The 80 e-transformers are connected in series and the result from * i is used as input to * i+1 . The 80 bit key K is divided into 40 2-bit values
The quasigroups used in Edon80 are given in Figure 1 .
Let the value in * i at time t be denoted a i,t . Then the values are updated as
where a i denotes the initial value of * i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 79 at the beginning of the keystream generation phase. For simplicity, we adopt the notation Z = z 1 , z 3 , z 5 , . . . as the received keystream, where z t = a 79,t t ≥ 0, t odd.
A schematic picture of Edon80 is given in Figure 3 . Remember that only every second output is used in the keystream. The initial state of Edon80, (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 79 ), is determined by the key K and the IV through an IV setup process. Exactly how this is done is not relevant in our analysis and we refer to the design document [1] for a detailed description of the IV setup. We can assume that the mapping from the 80-bit key and the 64-bit IV to the initial state a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a 79 is a random mapping. However, the attack will still be applicable even if the mapping would be shown to suer from some nonrandomness.
Edon80 is designed to be a hardware ecient stream cipher. The hardware description is slightly dierent from the algorithmic description given above. In order to output 1 bit/clock, the implementation uses a second 2-bit memory cell in * i which stores the output from * i−1 . Though, in [6] the authors demonstrated an implementation which does not use this extra memory cell. The implementation required only a gate count of about 3000 but the output was decreased to 1/80 bit/clock resulting in a throughput of just a few Mbit/s. However, this small implementation cost shows that Edon80 is a very interesting candidate for a stream cipher suitable for constrained environments.
Previous Analysis of Edon80
In this section we review the previous results and known properties of Edon80 that will be used in our cryptanalysis. The most important property that will be exploited in the attack is the relatively short period of Edon80. In the design document [1] it was stated that the expected average period of the keystream is about 2 103 . In [2] , Hong argued that there are many key/IV pairs that produce a keystream with undesirably short period. Referring to Figure 2 , using exhaustive search all d-row key/state pairs of period p = 4, 8 and 16 was found.
Extrapolating the results to 40 rows, and then repeating the same key for the lower 40 rows, it was concluded that there are many key/IV pairs that produce a keystream with relatively short period. As an example, it was claimed that there is a 2 −75 probability that a key/IV pair generates a keystream with period 2 61 . In response to these results, the designers claimed in [3] that the values given by Hong was actually underestimated and that the probability of generating a keystream with period less than 2 61 was 2 −18.62 . Thus, with a total of 2 79.62 bits we can expect to nd a sequence with period less than 2 61 . Further, it was concluded that the average period of Edon80 is 2 91 . A more detailed investigation of the periods was given in [4] . Each e-transformer increases the period of the incoming string by a factor 1, 2, 3 or 4. Let X i denote the factor by which e-transformer * i increases the period. Considering several consecutive e-transformers, it was shown that the probability distribution for X i converges to the stationary distribution . Furthermore, let 2m be the total number of e-transformers and let P 2m be a random variable for the period after 2m e-transformers. Then when m → ∞, probability density function (pdf) f P2m can be approximated by the continuous function [4, section 2]
We refer to [4] for more details. Despite the relatively high probability of short periods, it has until now been unclear how to use this to obtain information about the key.
A Key Recovery Attack Basic Ideas
In this section we give the ideas behind our key recovery attack on Edon80. The details are then given in Section 5. We assume a known plaintext scenario i.e., the keystream sequence Z = z 1 , z 3 , z 5 , . . . is known to the adversary. The basic ideas behind the attack are based on the following properties of the cipher,
completely determined by the key. For example, if we know which quasigroup is used in the last e-transformer, we also know 2 key bits.
The period of the string produced by * i can be expected to be moderately small for small i. In fact, some internal values (output from e-transformers) will repeat with large probability due to the periodicity.
We visualize the attack in Figure 4 by considering a matrix with elements a i,j , (0 ≤ i ≤ 79, t ≤ j ≤ t + u + v), u, v to be dened later. Every column here corresponds to one specic time instance t. Also, the ith row corresponds to the ith e-transformer. Thus we have 80 rows in the Edon80 description. A restriction to the rst B rows simply corresponds to an Edon instance with only B etransformers. Looking at a specic value a i,j , this value is calculated from its neighbours to the left and above. I.e., the value at position (i, j) will depend on all values at positions (i , j ) for i < i and j < j, i.e., all values above and to the left in the matrix.
In order to set up the attack, we select the B top rows as one part (upper part) and the remaining rows below as a second part (lower part) of the etransformers. Consider two vectors, X and Y of length v = |X| and u = |Y | respectively,
. . , u, with the values located as shown in Figure 4 . For Edon80, we then have B = 80 − u − 1. As can be seen, the X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x v ) vector is simply v symbols coming out of the chain of B e-transformers starting from some predetermined time. The Y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y u ) can be characterized as the values needed to compute the internal state of the second part of the e-transformers. Each quasigroup transformation will increase the period of the initial string by a factor of 1, 2, 3 or 4. Thus the period, denoted P i , of the sequence produced by * i is given by
for some µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Z. Let P B be the period of the sequence produced by the upper part of the e-transformers, giving output corresponding to the vector X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x v ). Then, the matrix corresponding to time instance t and time instance t + kP B , k = 0, 1, 2, . . . will have the same values in the e-transformers * i for i ≤ B. More specically, and which will be used in the attack, the vector X will have the same value in all considered time instances. Assume for a moment that the key bits used to determine the quasigroups in the second part are known. With in total u + v values in the vectors X and Y , we consider the (u + v)/2 known keystream symbols that are directly below X and Y , see Figure 4 again. Using the knowledge of these keystream symbols, the number of possible combinations of the two vectors X, Y will be reduced from 4 u+v to roughly 2 u+v . The idea is to choose u and v such that v > u. This means that not all X vectors will be possible in the set of possible X, Y pairs. Thus, the outcome of this part is a set Γ k such that
Finally, we combine this with the fact that the vector X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x v ) will be the same at time instances t and t+kP B . This means that X must appear in all sets Γ k and hence in the intersection of them. The procedure should now be clear.
For each choice of the 2u + 2 key bits used to dene the quasigroups in the lower part, we determine the sets Γ k , for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We take the intersection between the sets obtained so far, and continue until the intersection is empty. If we eventually receive an empty intersection, the chosen value of the key bits is discarded. On the other hand, if at the end there is only one vector X in the intersection, then we assume that we found the correct key bits. The number of key bits that are guessed in this attack is 2u + 2. When we know these key bits, the remaining part of the key could be exhaustively searched.
A More Detailed Analysis of the Attack
In this section we give a more detailed analysis of the dierent parts and parameters used in the attack. The parameters that will be covered are Guessing the correct period P B . The length of the vectors X and Y . The number of time instances that has to be considered in order to discard a wrong key candidate.
The Period P B
As stated in (2), the period of the sequence after B e-transformers have the form P B = 2 µ1 3 µ2 for some µ 1 , µ 2 . It is clear that the X vector will repeat the same values if the distance between two matrices as described in Figure 4 is a multiple of the period. So we will assume a distance P B and the repetition of the value for the X vectors will be true if the actual period is a factor, i.e., if P B |P B . We denote the probability that P B |P B by α P B . This value is, according to [4] , approximately calculated as
where f P2m (s) is dened in (1).
Recall that X i denoted the factor by which e-transformer * i increases the period. In Section 3 we saw that the probability distribution for X i converges to the distribution . This gives us a rough idea of the expected period. For example, if B = 64 we can expect around 16 of the factors being 1, around the same number being 2, around 22 factors being 3, and around 10 factors being 4. So for B = 64 we can set P B = 2 36 · 3 22 and there is a fairly large chance that P B |P B . The actual probability for dierent values of the period deviated slightly from the above since the probabilities are not as the asymptotic ones for low values of i. However, it can all be computed numerically.
The Length of Vectors X and Y
Assuming that we have chosen a value B = 80 − u − 1 and an assumed period P B such that P B |P B , we now consider the choice of v. In order to create a set Γ k where not all X vectors appear we need to choose v > u. We denote the dierence by d, hence
The simplest approach is then to start at time t and move forward. We assign all 4 2 possible values to y 1 , y 2 . We can then calculate everything below these positions in Figure 4 . As we already know the value of z t+2 , only 4 of the possible candidates for y 1 , y 2 will survive. For each surviving value of y 1 , y 2 , we assign all possible values for y 3 , y 4 , compute the values below and check against the known value of z t+4 . We will have 16 possibilities for the (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) vector. After nishing the Y vector we just continue in this fashion with x i , i = 1, . . . x v . The set of possible assignments of (Y, X) is then 2 u+v . The complexity of calculating this set in this basic way is then roughly 2 u+v . Finally, the Y values are stripped o and the result is the set Γ k . In an actual implementation we can make the constant factor in the algorithm very small. This will be described in more detail in Section 6.
The Number of Intersections Needed to Discard a Key Candidate
The total number of possible X vectors is 4 v . However, in the algorithm, using the knowledge of the keystream z t , the vector X can only take 2 u+v values. Thus, using v = u + d, only a fraction 1/2 d of all values will be possible. Actually, in practice it is slightly less because some X vectors may appear twice (for dierent Y vectors). If we put
we see that we need about K ≈ 2v d sets Γ k , k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 to get an empty intersection. At least, the average number is around 2v/d. As an example, for the choice v = u + 2 (d = 2) there can be at most 25% of all the X vectors in Γ k . Since the number of possible X vectors is 4 v we expect that we do not need much more than v sets.
In general, a higher value of d will increase the computational complexity but since the reduction of possible X values in an intersection is much higher, it will lead to a smaller number of required intersections and hence a shorter required keystream length.
Computational Complexity
Let us summarize the computational complexity of the attack. We assume rst a value B = 80 − u − 1 and P B such that P B |P B . There is an error probability, 1 − α P B that this assumption is not true.
Then we guess 2u + 2 key bits corresponding to the last u + 1 quasigroups used. For each such key the complexity of checking it is then roughly 2 u+v · K. Since v = u + d this results in a total complexity of about
After recovering 2u + 2 key bits one can either reconstruct the sequence after B e-transformers and apply the same attack again, now with much less complexity; or simply do an exhaustive key search on the remaining key bits.
Algorithmic Aspects
In this section we describe some algorithmic aspects of the attack and show that the complexity is based on very simple operations, much faster than the operation of verifying a key candidate in exhaustive key search. The considerations here relate to the part of the attack that calculates the Γ k sets. Let (a B+1,t , a B+2,t , . . . , a 79,t ) be the state of the lower part of Edon80 at time t and denoted S t . In Figure 4 this corresponds to a column starting below an x i value.
In a straight forward algorithm we save all possible states S t and the corresponding X vector. Each time a new a 79,t (t even) is introduced, each state S t with corresponding X vector will produce 4 new states. Each new state will have a corresponding X vector with 2 additional entries. Thus, at the end of the algorithm, we will have 2 u+v possible states and X vectors. We can note that the last step is the most expensive step. It will cost C · 2 u+v where C is the cost for making 2u + 2 table lookups. This constant can be signicantly reduced by using a slightly dierent algorithm.
We can take advantage of the following observation. Since the length of the state vector S t is u + 1 there are in general 4
u+1 possible values for the state of the lower part of Edon80 at any time. However, looking at the attack as illustrated in Figure 4 , where we have a given keystream sequence z t , z t+2 , . . ., we observe that at any time instance (with a received keystream symbol) only 2 2 u/2 dierent states of the second part of Edon80 are possible. This property comes from the fact that we know every second of the values z t = a 79,t . Knowing a 79,t and a 79,t+2 and allowing 4 possible values for a 79,t+1 will give 4 possibilities for the pair (a 77,t+2 , a 78,t+2 ). Knowing a 79,t , a 79,t+2 and a 79,t+4 and allowing 16 possibilities for (a 79,t+1 , a 79,t+3 ) gives 16 possibilities for the vector (a 75,t+4 , a 76,t+4 , a 77,t+4 , a 78,t+4 ) etc.
We can from the known keystream compute all 2 u possible states for times t + u + 1, t + u + 3, . . .. We can then obtain a trellis by including all possible state transitions from time t + u + 1 to t + u + 3 and so on. A state transition from time t + u + 1 to t + u + 3 can be labelled by the values of (x 1 , x 2 ) giving rise to that transition. This way of modelling the lower part of Edon80 is useful when we implement the algorithm for computing the Γ k sets for a given choice of key bits.
We can divide the X vector in two equally sized parts, X = (X 1 , X 2 ), where X 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x v/2 ) and X 2 = (x v/2+1 , x v/2+2 , . . . , x v ). We rst assign Y and compute possible values of Y as before. This is actually equivalent to computing the state of the second part of Edon80 at time t + u, so when we continue we do not keep the value of Y but instead we keep the state S t at the time we are considering. We continue as before, but only over the X 1 vector. This results in a set of possible X 1 vectors and their ending states S t+u+v/2 . The complexity of calculating this set is then C · 2 u+v/2 . Next, for every choice of the 2 u possible states S t+u+v/2 at time t + u + v/2, we assign all possible values for x v/2+1 , x v/2+2 , . . ., and create a second set of all possible X 2 vectors and their starting states S t+u+v/2 . The complexity of calculating this second set is also C · 2 u+v/2 . Thus, calculating the two sets is much faster than nding Γ k in the straight forward algorithm.
The bottle neck in this algorithm is to create Γ k from the two sets. This is done by selecting all possible combinations of X 1 and X 2 where the ending state of X 1 and the starting state of X 2 are the same. With the two sets sorted according to the states S t+u+v/2 , the set Γ k is easily obtained. Since the size of Γ k is about 2 u+v this does not change the asymptotic complexity but the constant term in the complexity is very small. Each operation consists of just concatenating X 1 and X 2 , a very simple operation.
The memory requirement in the algorithm is moderately small. We need about 2 u+v words, where each word represents an X vector.
Simulation Results
In order to verify the attack, it has been simulated on a reduced version of Edon80. We have produced a keystream exactly as in Edon80 with the modication that only 24 e-transformers was used, i.e., a variant logically denoted Edon24. We have investigated the case when the assumed period P B is such that P B |P B . The simulations target the number of possible values for the vector X that are still possible after intersecting the k sets Γ k , k = 0, 1, . . . , k . Table 1 shows the average number of remaining elements for dierent values of k when v = u + 2, i.e., when d = 2. As stated in Section 5.3 we expect that we need about v intersections of sets Γ k . For all simulated values of u we have in average only 0.1 possible value for the X vector left in Γ k after v = u + 2 intersections. This veries our claim. Table 2 shows the average number of remaining elements when d = 6. As expected, the intersections produce an empty set with much fewer sets Γ k than in the case with d = 2. Moreover, our implementation also always found the correct key and discarded all false key candidates using our algorithm. 78 · 11, where the factor 11 comes from the fact that we need to intersect at most 11 + 1 sets Γ k . With the low computational complexity we can of course increase the d parameter and reduce the required keystream to roughly 2 78 . Finally, we must include the error probability. An error occurs if P B is not a multiple of the true period P B . We simply use (3) to estimate this probability. A numerical calculation gives that the period is below 2 78 with probability more than 1/2. There may be some possible periods below 2 78 which does not divide P B . On the other hand, we can try out dierent (the most probable) forms of P B in our attack with only a slight increase in complexity. So here we can assume that the error probability is about 1 − α P B ≈ 1/2. Clearly, such a long received keystream sequence as 2 78 is not desirable, even if the computational complexity is low. We also see that allowing the error probability to be quite close to 1 might be benecial. We will then repeat the attack α −1 P B times and the requirement is now to receive α −1 P B dierent keystreams (obtained from dierent IV values). The computational complexity, T , grows to
Though in average we only need slightly less than K intersections, there will be key candidates that need more intersections before they can be discarded. On the other hand, it is not crucial that all wrong key candidates are discarded. If we end up with a set up possible keys then these keys can be tested individually at the end. This will not aect the computational complexity. With P B · K keystream bits, we will have K + 1 sets Γ k , k = 0, 1, . . . , K to intersect. This will keep the probability of false alarm low. Thus, the number of keystream bits, D IV , that are needed from each IV is given by
The total number of keystream bits, D tot , is given by
The trade-o parameters in the attack are u, d and P B . The attack complexities are all functions of these values. We consider two cases.
I There is no restriction on the amount keystream that can be generated by one key/IV pair. II We respect the limitation given in [7] , i.e., only 2 48 keystream bits can be generated before reinitialization with a new IV.
In Table 3 we tabulate some possible values of T , D IV and D tot for the two dierent cases. With no restriction on the keystream per key/IV pair the parameter choice u = 13, d = 4 and P B = 2 58 gives about 2 69 for both computational complexity and total amount of keystream. We conclude that we have an attack requiring a total of 2 69 received keystream bits and 2 69 simple operations to recover the key.
If we respect the 2 48 limit, choosing parameters u = 9, d = 6 and P B = 2
